It may be too late to save Iraq
Trudy Rubin
December 19, 2006
In military parlance, there is a concept known as “the golden hour.” It refers to the window of time within which badly wounded troops have a good chance of surviving if they can be evacuated to medical facilities. But if this window closes, the chance of saving the wounded soldiers drops sharply.
“We have missed the golden hour,” I was told recently by a U.S. officer with extensive combat experience outside Baghdad. He was referring to the chance of stabilizing Iraq.
That’s also the feeling I got when I read the much-awaited report last week of the Iraq Study Group chaired by James Baker and Lee Hamilton. The recommendations make great sense, but it may be too late to save the patient.
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That said, I believe the report largely reflects the direction in which U.S. policy in Iraq is headed. Even though President Bush already has rejected key points, I think events are moving beyond his control.
The report revolves around two key ideas:
First, the need for a new diplomatic initiative in the region, in which the United States would press Iraq’s neighbors, including Syria and Iran, to stop meddling and help stabilize the country.
Second, a change in the main mission of U.S. forces. They would pull back from fighting insurgents but would insert thousands of trainers into Iraqi military units, pushing Iraqis to assume the major combat role. The goal would be to withdraw most U.S. combat units by early 2008, while support troops, special forces and rapid reaction teams would remain.
In the days since the report’s release, Bush has distanced himself from the 2008 date. Some critics of the report, such as Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., have called the withdrawal a prescription for defeat. It’s hard to believe that Iraqi troops, with their checkered record, will be ready in time.
But mistakes of the past limit the possibilities of the present. I believe McCain is right that more U.S. troops could have stabilized Iraq early on, but former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld chose not to send them. Now there are no more U.S. troops to send for any extended period. A temporary “surge” of 20,000 cannot stabilize troubled areas; Sunni insurgents would return when the “surge” leaves.
So we have little choice but to turn more responsibility over to Iraqi forces, however unreliable. Iraqi leaders visiting Washington, including Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and top Shiite political leader Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, have requested heavier equipment for their military as well as more control of its actions. A stepped-up program for inserting U.S. trainers into Iraqi units already has begun.
As for the 2008 date, it is risky indeed. But events in Iraq won’t wait on our timetable.
If Iraqis haven’t produced a coherent government by 2008 and if Iraqi troops haven’t improved by 2008, the game already will be up. The presence of U.S. troops will have become irrelevant as sectarian conflict surges around them and they retreat to their bases.